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Comparative research on international migration has increasingly focused on immigrant 
integration rather than the process of emigration. By investigating the different streams of 
Chinese migration to the United States and Europe, as well as the different stages of Chinese 
migration to the U.S., this study examines the way in which both receiving and sending contexts 
combine to shape the process of emigration. Using data from a 2002-2003 survey of emigration 
from China’s Fujian Province, we demonstrate that under restrictive exit and entry policies and 
high barriers to migration (i.e., clandestine migration from Fuzhou to the United States), 
resources such as migrant social capital, political capital (cadre resources), and human capital all 
play a crucial role in the emigration process. However, the roles of these resources in the 
migration process are limited when migration barriers are sufficiently low and when local 
governments adopt proactive policies promoting emigration (i.e., legal migration from Mingxi to 
Europe). Comparisons over time suggest that the importance of migrant social capital, political 
capital, and human capital has strongly persisted for Fuzhou-US emigration, as a result of 
tightening exit and entry policies. Despite these marked differences between Fuzhou and Mingxi 
emigration, the results also point to two general processes that are highly consistent across 
settings and over time—the cumulative causation of migration and the advantage conferred by 









The past three decades of China’s economic reform and opening have led to large-scale 
international migration. This wave of Chinese migration is marked not only by scale, but also by 
the diversifying source regions and destinations that comprise different contexts of exit and 
reception (Liang 2001; Cheng 2007). By investigating different streams of Chinese migration to 
the United States and to Europe, as well as the different stages of migration to the United States, 
the present study examines how the receiving context combines with the sending context to 
shape the process of emigration across streams and over time.  
  The main research question is examined by investigating the roles of three kinds of 
resources relevant to the migration process: migrant social capital, political capital, and human 
capital. We first assess the ways in which kinship migrant networks and village migrant 
networks moderate the costs and risks of emigration across contexts and over time. Second, we 
examine how political capital, as accumulated through cadre status, interacts with context to 
shape the formal and informal conduct of emigration. Of particular interest is the context 
characterized by different and changing local state policies in sending areas. Third, we 
investigate the extent to which the availability or restrictedness of migration opportunities 
conditions the role of human capital characteristics in emigration. In assessing these three 
questions, we conduct both cross-setting (cross-stream) comparisons and over-time comparisons. 
Previous research conducted in the setting of Mexico-US migration suggests that migrant 
streams tend to progressively broaden to include less selective individuals over time (Massey, 
Coldring, and Durand 1994). We offer an alternative scenario, in which the specific contexts 
render emigration continuously reliant on various social resources over time. 
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  The present study joins a growing body of comparative research on international migration 
(Massey 1999; Model, Fisher, and Siliverman 1999; Portes 1999;Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 
2004l Foner 2005; Alba and Waters 2011; Donato et al. 2010),  which has focused largely on 
immigrant integration rather than the process of emigration. This study provides the first effort to 
compare different flows of Chinese international migration as ingrained in disparate contexts of 
exit and reception. To the extent that certain factors play out similarly across contexts and over 
time, comparative analyses facilitate an understanding of fundamental processes underpinning 
migration that have broader theoretical and practical significance. Comparative analyses also 
allow for identification of differences, and therefore, help us identify circumstances under which 
migration processes operate differently. In general, the adoption of a comparative framework 
helps migration scholars test innovative hypotheses on the migration and integration processes 
that link the socio-political contexts of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving societies. 
  This study uses systematic data collected in 2002-2003 from two regions in Fujian 
province. Fujian province is chosen because it has become one of the most prominent migrant-
sending regions in China. The province also sends divergent flows of emigrants with respect to 
backgrounds, destinations, and local structures: one stream is characterized by long-distance 
illegal emigration to the United States, and the other by shorter-distance legal emigration to 
Europe. The data collection design adopted the ethnosurvey approach used in the Mexican 
Migration Project, and was implemented similarly in the two sending regions in Fujian. This 
enables useful comparisons between Chinese immigration flows and with non-Chinese 
immigration. We employ event history analysis with time-varying covariates to capture the 
dynamic migration process.  
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CONTEXTS OF CHINESE MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO 
EUROPE 
We first introduce the two streams of Chinese emigration and the respective destination and 
origin contexts. The history of Chinese immigration dates back over a century, to the gold rush in 
the United States (Poston and Luo 2007) and to European colonial expansion (Alexander 1973). 
These immigrants came predominately from the Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces. But the 
level of emigration from China dropped to extremely (and artificially) low levels following the 
1949 Revolution and throughout China’s collective period. Since the onset of economic reforms 
in the late 1970s, Chinese emigration increased again, this time to an unprecedented level. Fujian 
province, located in the southeastern coastal region of China (Figure 1), has become one of the 
largest immigrant-sending provinces, accounting for nearly 18 percent of Chinese international 
migrants by the 2000s (Liang 2001). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Today’s Fujianese emigrants originate from different sending areas and settle in different 
destinations. The largest (and best-known) group of emigrants comes from coastal Fujian to the 
United States, often through clandestine means. By the mid-1990s, roughly 200,000 illegal 
immigrants from Fujian had come to the United States (Kyle and Koslowski 2001). And as of 
2007, more than 30,000 illegal Fujianese continued to arrive every year (Blatt 2007). A more 
recent and fast-growing group of Fujianese migrants originates from the interior of the province. 
Since the late 1980s, this group of emigrants has settled in Europe, especially Italy, Hungary, and 
Russia By the early 2000s, the total estimated size of this group was over 200,000 (Laczko 
2003). The large-scale Fujianese migration has drawn worldwide attention and scholarly interest. 
Most existing work focuses on migration to the United States (Kwong 1997; Chin 1999; Liang et 
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al. 2008; Zhou 2009), although Pieke et al. (2004) and Li (2005) have studied the socioeconomic 
well-being of Fujianese in Europe. However, there has been no empirical study of the process of 
migration to Europe, nor any systematic comparison of these two streams of Chinese migration. 
 
Geo-political Contexts in Transit and Receiving Countries 
What are the macro-level factors that shape these different streams of migration? We next 
highlight contrasts between Europe and the United States as destinations, as well as between the 
Fuzhou and Mingxi areas as sending regions. This discussion is summarized in Appendix A.  
 With respect to geopolitical context, the United States is geographically distant from 
China. The trip for Chinese clandestine emigrants often involves highly circuitous routes and 
irregular means, via transit regions in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. 
Furthermore, clandestine migration from China to the United States requires highly professional 
organization via human smuggling networks. These networks have adopted several strategies. 
The most difficult is relying on forged documents to land directly in the United States  A more 
common strategy involves traveling to transit countries across the globe with legitimate visas, 
and then moving on to the United States by sea, by air, or overland (Chin 1999). Either way, 
such complex organization entails substantial migration expenses, which have increased steadily 
from $18,000 during the 1980s to $35,000 during the 1990s, to as high as $70,000 today (Keefe 
2009). The rising costs are partly a result of tightening border controls, which have resulted in 
lower permeability of the United States border. 
Another important contextual factor is United States immigration policy, which has 
prioritized family reunification, but set a national origin quota for other types of immigrants. 
Furthermore, the granting of amnesty is relatively rare, and has been offered only occasionally to 
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specific groups since 1986. Despite these difficulties, a large number of Chinese have entered 
illegally, particularly since the 1980s. Some suggest that specific United States asylum policies 
targeting Chinese nationals (i.e., political persecution, one-child policy) have actually 
encouraged illegal immigration (Chin 1999).[FOOTNOTE 1] 
 In contrast to the United States case, Fujianese going to Europe tend to emigrate legally. 
This glaring difference stems partly from the different geopolitical environment of Europe. 
China neighbors the former Soviet bloc and is relatively close to European countries (Figure 1). 
This affects Chinese migration options in three distinct ways. First, geographic proximity means 
that the journey to Europe is often overland, or a short one by air. Second, the disintegration of 
the Soviet bloc and the fall of the Berlin Wall opened an easy entryway for migrants to cross 
over to many parts of Europe (Pieke et al. 2004). Third, the lack of natural barriers in Europe and 
the integration of the European Union effectively increased the permeability of the border and 
hence the mobility of immigrants (Naim 2005).  
Equally important are the immigration policies across Europe (Pieke et al. 2004). For 
example, southern European countries (e.g., Italy) have systematically used immigrant 
regularization (i.e., regular amnesty and legalization) as a recruitment system. For this reason, 
Italy has become a main destination for Fujianese. The political transition in Hungary also 
opened doors for Chinese migrants. Between 1988 and 1992, a visa exemption agreement existed 
between China and Hungary, which meant that Chinese could freely enter Hungary and obtain 
legal residence in two to three years. In sum, the diverse immigration policies of European 
countries provide many Chinese with a convenient entryway into a large array of opportunities in 
Europe (Li 2005). 
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 These geopolitical features also lead to unique patterns of Chinese migration to Europe (Li 
2005). While most migrants arrive legally, some overstay their visas and become illegal aliens. 
Also, rather than being a one-time move, European migration is often an evolving process, with 
many migrants moving again (and sometimes clandestinely) in search of better opportunities 
across Europe. Although both the United States and Europe have embraced increasingly 
stringent measures to regulate immigration, the greater accessibility and flexibility associated 
with Chinese migration to Europe has resulted in much lower expenses and stakes compared to 
US-bound migration.  
Local Policies and Environment in Sending Areas 
Fujian Province’s major sending areas, Fuzhou and Mingxi, bear important similarities and 
distinctions. In terms of similarities, emigration has been increasingly ingrained in local social 
and economic life in both regions, and has become a status symbol and a strategy for family 
advancement (Pieke et al. 2004; Liang et al. 2008). With hundreds of millions of dollars in 
remittances each year, emigration increases prosperity in sending communities. 
 Nevertheless important differences also shape and are reshaped by migrant flows. Fuzhou 
is located in the coastal area of Fujian province (Figure 2). With respect to socioeconomic 
development, it is one of the most developed areas within the province (Appendix B). Fuzhou 
has generated the largest flow of US-bound migration from China and also has dominated overall 
international migration from Fujian Province (over 75 percent) (Liang 2001). At least half of 
Fuzhou emigrants are undocumented (Chin 1999). Within the local areas, there is an entire 
industry of emigration, from recruiting smugglers, shady visa services, to pre-emigration English 
lessons and vocational training. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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 Based on its recent history, Fuzhou emigration to the United States can be categorized into 
three stages. The first stage began in the late 1970s and lasted till the mid-1980s, during which 
time China embraced an open-door policy that ended restrictions imposed on international 
migration. As a result, some Fujianese began to use their overseas family ties to seek better life 
circumstances (Lin 2009). During this first phase, Fuzhou migration to the United States was 
mostly legal, and linked to existing connections, although clandestine migration started to 
emerge. Even though overall costs of emigration were low, the process was difficult for ordinary 
villagers, and the rate of emigration remained low. 
 From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Fuzhou migration entered a qualitatively and 
quantitatively different second stage, one that reflected a political environment that had been 
absent during the early stage. Enticed by the great fortune of earlier emigrants, co-villagers, 
many of whom had no foreign connections, were strongly motivated to undertake the adventure. 
As a result, irregular migration to the United States accelerated and culminated in the mid-1990s 
(Chin 1999). The cost of emigration also grew rapidly. This increase in irregular migration did 
not receive much international attention until the 1990s (in the wake of the Golden Venture 
tragedy in 1993—a ship bearing 286 illegal Fujianese ran aground in New York, leaving ten 
dead). Nor did government authorities in Fuzhou pay much attention. Because emigration fueled 
local economies, government sanctions remained relatively lenient even as illegal emigration 
was on the rise. Some local authorities tacitly permitted such movements; some were even 
peripherally involved in the highly profitable smuggling enterprises (Chin 1999). 
 The third stage of Fuzhou emigration to the United States began in the mid-1990s, when 
the Chinese government stepped up measures against human smuggling (Chin 2003). In 1997, 
the National People’s Congress amended the Criminal Law by attaching articles detailing harsh 
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penalties for human smuggling. Accordingly, Fujian authorities launched anti-smuggling 
campaigns to prosecute smugglers; they also imposed huge fines for individuals who were 
caught in illegal border crossings or deported back from the United States The provincial 
government has made many efforts with regard to border patrol, and has periodically suspended 
the issuance of passports (although from time to time some of these provincial policies are 
stymied by pragmatic local officials for local economic interests). Illegal emigration has thus 
become increasingly difficult. However, this has done little to dampen the desire for migration, 
and the unintended consequences of these restrictive measures include increased demand for 
smuggling services and rising smuggling fees. 
 Mingxi county, which is located in the mountainous northwest of Fujian (Figure 2), has 
sent the largest number of migrants from Fujian to Europe. Mingxi relies heavily on agriculture 
and has experienced lower socioeconomic development relative to the coastal Fuzhou area. 
Emigration from Mingxi emerged virtually from scratch since the late 1980s. By the early 2000s, 
about 10 percent percent of the total population in Mingxi had emigrated (Li 2005). These 
migrants spread across 23 countries, but the majority (over 70 percent percent) settled in Italy, 
Hungary, and Russia.  
 The large volume of emigration has had a major impact on the local economy. Annual 
remittances totaled over $10 million in 2002 (Pieke et al. 2004). Given the legality of emigration 
and the heavy reliance of local development on remittances, the local political context is 
favorable to emigration. The local government has embraced a much more proactive and open 
approach toward emigration than in Fuzhou (Pieke et al. 2004; Li 2005). Local authorities have 
set labor export as a top economic priority and have stipulated that all officials in emigration 
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services must provide full support for prospective migrants by simplifying procedures and 
improving the quality and efficiency of their services (Li 2005). 
 Local governments have also mounted concerted and structured efforts to assist emigrants. 
Across Mingxi, federations of overseas Chinese have been established, providing general 
information and assistance in areas such as passage and employment. Official emigration service 
centers have been built to help peasants apply for visas and purchase air tickets, as well as to 
provide consultation about job opportunities. Handbooks on European language and culture are 
available to aspiring migrants. Local authorities also set up free language and vocational training 
courses to teach aspiring migrants skills such as sewing, cooking, computers, and trading. 
Additionally, local governments have relaxed policies under which commercial banks and 
village credit cooperatives may provide loans to prospective migrants. In Mingxi, emigrants have 
also been given political recognition and are publicly regarded as model members of the 
community. This wide range of local institutional support substantially reduces the barriers to 
emigration and changes the cost-benefit calculation for aspiring migrants.  
 
THREE TYPES OF CAPITAL AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION PROCESSES 
Previous research has examined the roles of social, political, and human capital in shaping 
international migration, and in some cases, illustrated how macro contexts condition the roles of 
that capital.  
Social Capital 
A number of studies of the migration process have focused on the role of social capital, as 
formulated in social capital and cumulative causation theories (Massey 1990). The basic logic is 
that because migration is often a costly and risky enterprise, prospective migrants draw on 
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interpersonal networks for information, resources, and assistance. These social resources from 
family and friends channel later immigrants to similar destinations, as well as facilitate their 
arrival and settlement (social capital theory). At the macro-level, this process sets off structural 
and cultural changes in the origin communities in ways that expose people to greater diffusion of 
migration norms, lower barriers to migration, and the emergence of a culture of migration. The 
result is the perpetuation of migration (cumulative causation theory). 
  Previous research has also explored how the role of social capital and cumulative patterns 
varies depending on context. Fussell and Massey (2004) demonstrate different network effects in 
rural and urban origins in Mexico, with migrant networks operating less effectively in urban 
areas where social networks are more complex but less pervasive. Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 
(2003) contend that migrant networks are more important for international moves than for 
internal moves within Mexico, presumably because US migration entails greater barriers and 
thus requires more social resources. In addition, several studies have laid out the respective roles 
of different types of social networks, namely kinship ties and village networks. Family ties tend 
to provide more reliable information and greater assistance to migrants (Massey et al. 1987). 
Village migration networks, on the other hand, provide greater information and normative 
pressure (Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2001). 
 In the context of China-US migration, Liang et al. (2008) show that the role of migration 
networks is not uniformly positive. Migrant social capital acts not only to provide information 
about the destination and the passage, but more importantly, to provide financial resources to 
cover the high costs incurred in clandestine migration. The high expenses involved in US 
migration imply that families are often unable to immediately provide for additional migrants 
until the debt for the previous migrant has been paid off. Therefore, having United States 
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migrants in the family tends to first decrease and then gradually increase the chances of further 
migration from China. 
Political Capital 
The role of political capital in immigration has been studied less extensively than that of social 
capital. Existing research has focused largely on transnational political networks, the 
implications of those networks for domestic and global politics, and the ways in which sending 
states implement policies to strengthen emigrants’ homeland participation (Levitt, DeWind, and 
Vertovec 2003). Less is understood about the way that political capital interacts with local 
policies and interests to shape the emigration process. China is a suitable setting for addressing 
this inquiry, since political capital carries important resources and positional power in social and 
economic life. Despite some speculation that the economic transformation in China would lead 
to a decline of political power (Nee 1989), many studies demonstrate the persistent advantage of 
traditional distributive power (Parish and Michelson 1996; Zhou 2000; Walder 2002). 
 Liang et al. (2008) examine Fujianese emigration to the United States as it relates to one’s 
political position in the sending community, measured by individual and household cadre status. 
Their study finds that cadres have much less incentive to emigrate, presumably because they 
often derive considerable socioeconomic advantage in local communities. Nevertheless, other 
individuals in cadre households seem more likely to emigrate, a finding that highlights the role of 
political capital in circumventing state policies and in reducing the costs of unauthorized 
migration. In China, cadres make many important decisions and control important resources in 
rural villages within their jurisdiction (O’Brien and Li 1999). Therefore, when it comes to 
clandestine emigration such as that from Fuzhou to the United States, cadres are able to facilitate 
family members’ migration. They do so by providing crucial documents (i.e., birth certificate, 
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passport); by offering first-hand information about migration opportunities and policies that 
would otherwise be difficult and costly to obtain; by offering favors to smugglers in exchange 
for reduced costs; and by ensuring the cooperation of local law enforcement authorities (i.e., 
coast guards, border patrol agents).  
Human Capital 
Some studies have examined the effect of personal characteristics such as human capital on 
likelihood of international migration as they are associated with the potential benefits of 
migration (e.g., expected wages). The findings are not clear-cut because understanding the effect 
of human capital requires knowing the extent to which human capital is rewarded at places of 
origin and destination. For example, in Mexico education is unrelated or negatively related to 
international migration, because human capital acquired in Mexico is not well remunerated in the 
United States (Borjas 1987; Massey and Espinosa 1997). By contrast, the effect of education 
turns positive in the context of Mexican internal migration (Bohra and Massey 2011). Adding to 
the complexity is the fact that many studies resort to a linear measure of education, which could 
conceal the potential nonlinear relationship between human capital and migration. For example, 
human capital may increase the likelihood of migration up to a certain threshold (neoclassical 
model). But after a certain level, human capital may be negatively related to migration as the 
economic return of additional schooling diminishes in the destination but remains high in the 
labor market at origin (new economics model).  
Patterns of Immigrant Selectivity 
Although migration often begins with selective socio-demographic groups in origin 
communities, the characteristics of migrants progressively broaden as migration becomes more 
ingrained in local life and as barriers for new migrants decrease (Massey, Goldring, and 
 15 
Durand 1994). Over time, therefore, personal characteristics such as human capital become 
relatively less important in determining migration behavior. This pattern, first observed in 
Mexico, was recently tested in the context of internal migration from rural Thailand (Garip and 
Curran 2010). The study finds that for individuals with less access to migratory social capital, 
their own characteristics remain important in the migration process. Previous studies, however, 
rarely examined over-time patterns in the role of resources other than human capital that 
underpin migration. 
 
How Do Contexts Shape the Process of Chinese International Migration? 
Our comparison of Fujianese migration to the United States and Europe suggests that distinct 
contexts of reception, combined with distinct local government practices in sending areas, 
produce different barriers and different cost-benefit analyses regarding emigration. The result is 
disparate processes of emigration. When barriers (costs and stakes) to migration are high, 
particularly when the receiving and local sending governments enact restrictive migration 
policies, resources embedded in migrant social capital and political capital can be crucial in 
overcoming these barriers and circumventing legal restrictions on exit (emigration from Fuzhou). 
Also, socio-demographic characteristics such as human capital play a salient role in migration-
related cost-benefit analysis. In particular, when facing difficult migration circumstances, 
households may strategize to send individuals who are expected to garner higher economic 
returns to offset the high expenses and risks. By contrast, when immigration policy conditions 
are relatively lax, and when the local sending government proactively endorses emigration, 
migration opportunities are widely available (i.e., emigration from Mingxi). Under these 
circumstances, the roles of social and personal resources in facilitating migration are likely to be 
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less pivotal to overcoming barriers. Thus, our main hypothesis is: US migration from Fuzhou is 
more heavily reliant on social and political resources and more selective of human capital than 
European migration from Mingxi (Hypothesis 1).  
Specifically, with respect to social capital, we expect family migration networks to matter 
more for US-bound migrants than for Europe-bound migrants (Hypothesis 1.1). This is because 
family migration networks not only feed information about the process of irregular migration, 
but also offer tangible economic assistance for the trip. In a similar vein, we expect political 
capital (cadre resources) to have more importance for Fuzhou emigration to the United States 
than for Mingxi emigration to Europe (Hypothesis 1.2). In Fuzhou, where the act of emigration 
conflicts with formal state institutions, political capital forms a pool of resources for 
circumventing state policies, as well as for reducing the costs and risks of unauthorized 
migration. Ordinary people lacking such resources would be much less capable of evading 
regulations and excessive expenses. Cadres’ financial resources can also help facilitate irregular 
as well as legal emigration from Fuzhou, both of which tend to incur high costs. This is likely, 
given that local cadres are capable of accumulating more wealth than ordinary villagers. 
However, in Mingxi where local governments openly promote and enable emigration, the 
privileges and resources conferred by access to political capital or financial resources 
accumulated through it are much less important for successful migration. 
As for human capital, we expect that US migration from Fuzhou is much more selective on 
human capital than European migration from Mingxi (Hypothesis 1.3). One explanation may be 
that under difficult migration circumstances (i.e., Fuzhou-US migration), the decision to migrate 
often involves a highly deliberate cost-benefit calculation. Households strategize to send 
individuals who are expected to garner higher economic returns in order to offset the high 
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expenses and risks of migration. Such calculations are usually based on human capital 
considerations. It is also possible that, to the extent that migration is positively selected on 
human capital (e.g., innate ability, skills), such selectivity is more pronounced when the barriers 
to migration are high. By contrast, in situations where the costs are low and migration 
opportunities are readily available, especially when local authorities proactively promote 
emigration (i.e., Mingxi-Europe migration), selection based on human capital is likely to be low.  
 We further assess how the changing contexts underlying Fuzhou-US migration may shape 
its process over time. Whereas previous research suggests that migrant streams tend to 
progressively broaden to include less selective individuals, the case of Fuzhou emigration 
provides an unusual case study. There, barriers to migration remain high, especially as measures 
against illegal emigration become more stringent over time. Hence, we anticipate that rather than 
observing the diminishing importance of various resources, Fuzhou migration to the United 
States continues to rely heavily on migrant social capital and political capital, and continues to 
be selective on human capital over time (Hypothesis 2). 
Overall, these cross-context and over-time patterns generate variations in the aggregated 
migration streams. These variations can help explain the rapid expansion of emigration to Europe 
in a relatively short period of time (as compared to the stabilizing stream of Fuzhou-US 
migration). 
 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
The data used for this study were collected in identical ways in two regions in Fujian Province, 
the coastal Fuzhou prefecture and the inland Mingxi county. Probability samples were drawn and 
standardized questionnaires were used to facilitate comparisons across settings. The study largely 
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followed the ethnosurvey design for the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). A detailed 
description of the data is provided in Appendix C. In both surveys, the questionnaires for the 
MMP were used as models but were modified to fit into the Chinese context. The household 
questionnaire contains basic information on the socio-demographic characteristics of each 
household member (including those who went abroad), the internal and international migration 
history for all household members (including those who went abroad, such as the year and month 
of emigration, destination of the trip, costs for that trip, and type of departure documents used), 
and the household socioeconomic circumstances. Specific to the Chinese setting, questions on 
cadre status were also included. Because undocumented migration is a sensitive topic in Fujian, 
to improve response rates, detailed questions on the actual migration trip or costs were not asked. 
Instead, the questionnaire included a set of categories indicating the approximate expenses 
incurred in emigration.  
 The main models estimated the probability of making the first emigration trip using event 
history analysis. We study the first trip, because a very small fraction of the sample made 
multiple international trips. We restricted the analysis to individuals who are age fifteen or older, 
because emigration of younger people tended to be tied with parents’ migration. For each 
individual in each year since age fifteen, we recorded migration events along with individual, 
household, and community characteristics in that year. This was accomplished by converting the 
data into person-year form and estimating discrete-time event history models via logistic 
regression. 
 Migrant social capital was measured by household and village migration networks. At the 
household level, we created a measure indicating in a given year whether a family member had 
migrated before, and if, so the number of years that had elapsed since the first emigration. We 
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distinguished four categories: households with no prior emigrant, households with emigrants 
who had left within the past two years, between two and five years, and over five years. Such a 
measure is useful in capturing the dynamics of the effect. For village migration networks, we 
followed Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994) to calculate the village emigration prevalence 
ratio, using each person’s year of birth and the date of emigration. It was calculated for every 
community in every year and provided a simple indicator of how widespread migratory 
experience had become at any point in time in a given community. The denominator was the 
number of people fifteen years and over in a given year, and the numerator was the number of 
such people who had ever emigrated up to that year. 
 Other predictors included age, gender, marital status, education, cadre status at both 
individual and household levels, whether the household owned a family business, and place of 
residence. Family business was used to proxy family wealth (physical capital), following earlier 
research. Marital status, family business, and cadre status were designed to be time-varying 
predictors, with information on the timing of events such as the year and month of marriage, of 
starting and ending a family business, and of becoming a cadre (as discussed above, family and 
village-level migrant social capital measures are also time-varying). This allowed us to better 
ascertain the temporal order of events. As described in detail below, we conducted additional 
analysis to model emigration costs and temporal patterns of migration.  
 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
The results confirm that the emigration costs were much lower in Mingxi than in Fuzhou (Table 
1). In Mingxi, over 91 percent of all emigrants spent less than 10,000 US dollars, compared to 
only 24 percent of emigrants from Fuzhou. The median cost for Fuzhou emigrants was over 
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$30,000, and 24 percent of migrants spent over $50,000. Also consistent with previous studies, 
different migration streams have stemmed from the two sending regions (results not shown). The 
vast majority of emigrants from Fuzhou went to the United States In contrast, the vast majority 
of migrants from Mingxi headed for Europe, especially eastern and southern Europe. The top 
destinations were Italy, Hungary, and Austria, which drew over 87 percent of all migrants from 
Mingxi. Italy alone drew 70 percent. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 Figure 3 depicts the trend of emigration over time. We plotted the percentage of people 
who left Fuzhou and Mingxi in each year since the early 1980s. We see that the US migration 
from Fuzhou began at the time of China’s economic reforms, and accelerated between the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s. Migration experienced a slight decline shortly after the 1993 Golden 
Venture fiasco, and growth gradually leveled off in the mid-1990s due to the tightening measures 
against irregular migration. The drop in the early 2000s may be due largely to the September 11 
attacks, which had a deterrent effect on migration to the United States.  By contrast, European 
emigration from Mingxi lagged the development of Fuzhou emigration and has a shorter history. 
It began in the late 1980s and has become increasingly salient ever since. Over time there has 
been a rapid growth in Mingxi emigration, which by the 2000s reached levels similar to Fuzhou 
emigration (despite some ups and downs in the early 2000s associated with a few incidents 
involving Chinese immigrants in Europe, e.g., the Dover accident in 2000).  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 The cost of migration from Fuzhou steadily escalated as barriers continued to rise and the 
smuggling process became more sophisticated (Figure 4). We took the midpoints of the 
migration cost categories and converted them into the 2003 constant US dollars. The graph is 
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generally consistent with ethnographic work suggesting that the standard smuggling fee for 
Fujian–US migration rose from $18,000 to over $35,000 in the 1990s, reaching as high as 
$70,000 nowadays. By contrast, the cost of emigration from Mingxi to Europe was much lower 
and rather stagnant over time. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics for Fuzhou and Mingxi with tests of the 
differences between emigrants and non-emigrants. Given the longer history of emigration from 
Fuzhou, emigrants represented 40 percent of the sample in Fuzhou, comparing to 23 percent in 
Mingxi. With respect to socio-demographic characteristics, in both regions emigrants showed a 
classic profile. They were more likely to be young, single, and male. There was also some 
evidence that emigrants tended to be drawn from the middle of the educational distribution. The 
small fraction of people with college degrees were less likely to migrate, as they may be better 
positioned to take advantage of local opportunities. In Fuzhou, people from households owning 
family businesses were less likely to emigrate. We also see that the emigrants from Fuzhou were 
less likely to be cadres themselves but more likely to come from cadre households. Having a 
prior family emigrant seemed to deter further migration. Overall, these bivariate comparisons 
should be interpreted with caution because differences in basic characteristics between emigrants 
and non-emigrants were not adjusted. 





Results from event history regressions predicting the first overseas trip are shown in Table 3. 
Findings generally support our hypothesis about the differential roles of various resources in 
migration to the United States and Europe. In Fuzhou, having a family member who previously 
migrated to the United States had a negative impact on individual’s propensity to emigrate in the 
short run. But the effect became positive over time (after about 5 years). This is because 
clandestine migration to the United States incurred very high expenses and thus required 
considerable economic assistance from close kin; it would be very difficult for the family to 
support another emigrant shortly after the previous migrant departed (Liang et al. 2008). The 
ability for financing more migrants improved over time as prior emigrants paid off their debt and 
sent back regular remittances. With regard to Mingxi, however, the geopolitical environment in 
Europe and the active role of the local governments substantially lowered the barriers to 
emigration. Immigration to Europe thus became widely accessible to average villagers, both in 
informational and monetary terms, which reduced the importance of family migration networks. 
We performed joint tests of family migration network categories using likelihood ratio tests. The 
test was significant in Fuzhou but not in Mingxi, confirming the different roles of family 
migration networks across settings (Hypothesis 1.1). 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Despite these differences, there is one notable similarity between Fuzhou and Mingxi—
village migration networks substantially increased the probability of further migration. A 10 
percent increase in migration prevalence ratio was associated with over 50 percent increase in the 
odds of emigration. This finding lends support to the cumulative causation thesis. Regardless of 
the macro context, earlier migrants from the community provided an important channel of 
information and support for prospective migrants. They also led to a strong sense of relative 
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deprivation, thereby solidifying the motivation for further migration and creating a local culture 
of emigration. 
 With respect to political capital, in Fuzhou individuals from cadre households were much 
more likely to emigrate than others (Hypothesis 1.2). This may be because cadres were capable 
of exploiting their privileged positions to reduce the expenses and risks of emigration for family 
members. Possible ways to do this include providing crucial migration documents with minimal 
charges and first-hand information about migration opportunities and policies that would 
otherwise be difficult and costly to obtain; bargaining for lower smuggling fees through 
exchange of favors with smugglers; and lifting restrictions and ensuring the cooperation of local 
law enforcement authorities (Liang et al. 2008). This influence, however, was largely limited in 
Mingxi (difference in coefficients between Fuzhou and Mingxi is significant at the 0.05 level), 
where the barriers to emigration were low and the local authorities adopt a proactive approach in 
enabling emigration. Hence, access to cadre resources no longer provided competitive 
advantages in migration opportunities.  
 There is one important similarity with respect to the role of political capital. In both Fuzhou 
and Mingxi, cadres themselves were much less likely to emigrate than non-cadres. This resonates 
with previous research showing a persistent advantage of traditional distributive power. In many 
parts of China, cadres have continued to be important players in local life. Further, they gain 
substantial benefits from their positional power, sometimes even through abusing their power 
(e.g., appropriating state loans, extracting illegal taxes). This gives them little incentive to 
undertake emigration. The potential for cadres to reap economic gains tends to grow with the 
booming local economy, especially in areas fueled by overseas remittances and investment. 
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 Regarding human capital, we find that when emigration opportunities were readily 
available, as in Mingxi-Europe migration, there was little individual selectivity on human capital. 
Of all educational categories, only the coefficient of junior high school was marginally 
significant (the joint test of all categories was insignificant). However, in Fuzhou-US migration, 
migration became a selective process based on education (Hypothesis 1.3). But the educational 
selectivity was not strictly linear. People with greater education were generally more likely to 
migrate up to the postsecondary level. This selectivity may in part reflect the general human 
capital selectivity of emigration. It may also reflect the cost-benefit calculation in the migration 
decision-making process. Families would send out relatively well-educated people who had the 
necessary skills to generate high economic returns. Previous research showed that for Fujianese 
immigrants in the United States, having secondary school education was positively associated 
with job and income mobility as well as entrepreneurial attainment (Chunyu 2010). But to 
maximize overall household income, the most educated members (those with a college degree) 
may stay to take advantage of employment opportunities at home. 
 As for other characteristics, age was significantly associated with emigration in both 
settings, with younger people having a higher propensity to emigrate (those aged 20-40 were 
most likely to migrate). Men had a higher likelihood of emigration than women. Marital status 
was marginally significant in Fuzhou. Family wealth, measured by business ownership, appeared 
to indicate a lack of motivation for migration in Fuzhou. This was in line with findings from 
Mexico-US migration, which suggested that people with more physical capital assets were less 
likely to participate in migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997). The result is also consistent with 
the new economics of migration, which argues that people do not necessarily migrate to earn 
higher net incomes, but to secure capital for asset acquisition. However, this result should be 
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interpreted with caution because the data lack more precise measures on family wealth that 
would allow us to examine what types of households are more likely to own a family business.  
Therefore, the observed relationship could also be a reflection of the fact that people who are less 
eager to emigrate may decide to set up a family business as a long-term investment strategy.  
 
 We further illustrate the roles of migrant social capital and political capital by examining 
how they affect emigration costs (Table 4). Again, we took the midpoints of the emigration cost 
categories and converted them into the 2003 constant US dollars. We used log-transformed costs 
as the outcome and employed Heckman selection models, as emigration costs were observed 
only for emigrants (Heckman 1979). This method first modeled an individual’s likelihood of 
emigration using the same set of variables as Table 3 (selection model). In the second-stage 
regression, the method estimated emigration costs based on factors that could theoretically be 
associated with the costs (while controlling for the likelihood of selection into emigration). The 
Heckman selection model improves estimates in the cost regression by using information from 
non-emigrants via full-information maximum likelihood estimation. It also tests for correlation 
between residuals in the selection and cost regression (ρ). A significant test of ρ = 0 suggests a 
non-ignorable sample selection process. The test results are shown at the bottom of Table 4. It 
was significant in Fuzhou but not in Mingxi. This strengthened our hypothesis that emigration 
was a highly selective process for Fuzhou emigration to the United States (Hypothesis 1). 
[Table 4 about here] 
 Results from the cost regressions showed substantial differences between the two migration 
streams. In Mingxi-Europe migration, the costs did not appear to be associated with household 
resources because the low expenses were readily affordable by average families. However, for 
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US migration from Fuzhou, having previous emigrants in the households and access to cadre 
resources significantly lowered the costs of migration. Specifically, living in a cadre household 
reduced emigration fees by 28 percent, consistent with our speculation regarding the role of 
political capital. Individuals from households with previous emigrants also enjoyed lower costs, 
in part because they were better able to negotiate the costs with smugglers, especially after 
previous migrants paid off the fees and successfully settled down at the destination. Also, these 
households were often more trusted by the brokers and likely offered lower fees. Another reason 
may be that some of these later emigrants migrated legally as family members of earlier migrants 
who were legalized in the United States, which incurred much lower migration expenses. 
Interestingly, village migration networks seemed to increase emigration costs in Fuzhou. This 
may suggest that in places where both the demand for and barriers to migration were high, the 
fees were unlikely to be substantially reduced. They may even increase as government 
enforcement tended to be more stringent in these areas, leading to more sophisticated smuggling 
operations and thus higher fees. Finally, family wealth was positively (but weakly) related to 
emigration costs in Fuzhou, presumably because these households may be willing to pay higher 
fees to improve their chance of success. 
 
Over-Time Patterns in Fuzhou-US Migration 
Because Fuzhou migration to the United States is characterized by a changing sociopolitical 
environment, especially at the level of local sending areas, we further explore how contextual 
changes shape the social process of emigration over the three stages of Fuzhou emigration to the 
United States (Table 5). We did not conduct a similar analysis of Mingxi-Europe migration 
because of its shorter history and relatively small temporal variability in underlying contexts. 
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 Fuzhou experienced increasing emigration over time, from about 120 in the earliest stage to 
over 1,200 by the mid-1990s in our data, though the increase seemed to have leveled off since 
then. The average costs of migration also grew considerably, roughly four-fold by the mid-
2000s. We sought to examine the legality of emigration using information on the type of 
departure documents. This analysis was quite crude but was the best we could do given the data. 
Migrants departing with United States citizen status, a green card, or for reasons of contracted 
labor or family visit, were considered legal migrants. Others (those with tourist visas or 
unreported reasons) were treated as illegal migrants. In the first stage, 66 percent of emigrants 
held legal documents. When we restricted the sample to an earlier period (before the early 1980s) 
when the vast majority of emigrants had overseas connections, the percentage increased to over 
80 percent. Since the mid-1980s, the majority of emigrants have been illegal, and the percentage 
of regular migrants has dropped by over half. After the mid-1990s, regular migrants increased 
slightly, presumably because an increasing number of Fujianese emigrated as family members of 
earlier (legalized) migrants. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 We next turn to the cross-temporal variation in the social process of emigration. In Fuzhou, 
given the increasingly high barriers to emigration, and especially the tightening measures against 
illegal emigration in the sending areas, there exist strong and persistent roles of social and 
political resources and human capital selectivity (Hypothesis 2). During the first stage, household 
migration networks significantly promoted further emigration because migration followed 
primarily from overseas family connections. For this reason, other personal and household 
factors did not play a clear role. After this initial phase, the importance of sociopolitical 
resources and human capital became more evident. The positive effect of migrant social capital 
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was depressed in the short term but manifested over time. But as the legal toll and financial costs 
for sending additional migrants increased, families needed more time to be able to support 
further emigration. Hence, the positive role of migrant social capital became increasingly 
constrained, as shown in the most recent stage of emigration. In spite of the rising barriers, 
people appeared to continue to pool resources and take on debt to pursue their American dreams. 
The institutionalization of migration in local communities (village migrant prevalence ratio) has 
continued to sustain the motivation and act of emigration.  
 As emigration became subject to rising costs and pressures since the mid-1980s, the 
benefits and privileges conferred by political capital persisted, in terms of both garnering 
economic benefits and sanctioning the unauthorized act of emigration. Cadre households 
continued to be more likely to engage in emigration. The difference in the coefficients of 
household cadre status between the last two phases was insignificant. This observation suggested 
that, while deepening restrictions against illegal emigration and the rising expenses gradually 
dimmed the prospect of emigration for ordinary households, such difficulties could be largely 
overcome by the power vested in local cadres, who were able to circumvent state regulations and 
pave the way for their family members’ emigration. The slightly larger coefficient in the second 
stage may be because some local authorities were even peripherally involved in the smuggling 
business during this period. In addition, cadres themselves were consistently less motivated to 
emigrate, suggesting that the inherent advantages conferred to cadres have persisted.  
 The pattern of human capital selectivity was similar. Except for the first period, emigrants 
were drawn largely from relatively well-educated people, though not the small group with 
tertiary education. This suggested that because of the persistently high barriers, migration 
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continued to involve a high degree of self-selection, and/or that cost-benefit strategizing was 
occurring based on personal characteristics, especially those rewarded in the labor market. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Chinese international migration has increased in scale, as well as in the range of origins and 
destinations, since the beginning of the economic reforms. A prominent component of this is 
emigration from the Fujian province, which consists of different migration streams that are 
embedded in distinct destination geopolitical environments and local sending state practices. In 
the present study, we develop a comparative analysis to examine how the combination of origin 
and destination contexts shapes the emigration process across context and over time. To our 
knowledge, this is the first systematic comparison of different streams of Chinese international 
migration.  
 The findings add to our understanding of the role of contexts in conditioning the migration 
process. Emigration from the Fuzhou region to the United States has largely resorted to 
clandestine channels because of the long geographical distance and restricted means of migration 
to the United States. This has led to high costs and stakes of migration. By contrast, the 
geopolitical environment in Europe offers shorter distances, flexible routes, and a range of 
immigration policies to exploit. This has reduced the barriers to legal migration and substantially 
lowered the associated expenses and risks. In addition, local governments in the sending 
communities have developed differential responses to emigration. State authorities in Mingxi 
have adopted highly proactive and open practices to promote and enable international migration, 
whereas the Fuzhou government has stepped up stringent measures to combat irregular 
emigration, especially since the mid-1990s.  
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 Correspondingly, we observe substantial differences in the process of international 
migration, as reflected in the differential roles of resources conferred by migrant social capital, 
political capital, and human capital-based characteristics. When barriers to migration are high, as 
the receiving and sending governments enact restrictive migration policies (i.e., in the case of 
clandestine migration from Fuzhou to the United States), migrant social capital (family migration 
networks), political capital (cadre resources), and human capital (education) all play crucial roles 
in the emigration process. This is because these resources help circumvent formal state 
institutions and reduce the costs while enhancing the potential benefits of migration. However, 
the importance of these resources in the migration process is much less pronounced when 
immigration policy conditions are relatively lax and when local sending governments adopt 
proactive emigration policies (i.e., migration from Mingxi to Europe). Across different stages of 
emigration from Fuzhou over time, the importance of migrant social capital, political capital, and 
human capital has strongly persisted as a result of tightening migration restrictions and escalating 
costs.  
 Note that for Fujianese migration, the macro-level structural features at the origin and 
destination do not take shape simultaneously, but develop as a series of evolving and adaptive 
processes. The geopolitical institutions in the destination countries and the socioeconomic 
context in the origin have pulled or pushed the large exodus of Fujianese emigrants. Varying 
geopolitical environments and immigration regimes across the United States and Europe have 
important implications for the barriers (legal, financial, and personal) to immigration. These 
contexts of reception and the resultant patterns of migration have in turn shaped the strategies of 
the sending state, and importantly, have been further transformed by the local state in the sending 
areas. Because of this interdependence of receiving and sending contexts, we cannot definitively 
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identify the respective roles of origin and destination factors. Nevertheless, exploring how 
political capital intersects with sending contexts in influencing migration outcomes helps 
improve our understanding of the role of the sending state in the process of migration. This is 
because the importance of political capital is closely tied to the goals and interests of the local 
state. When the act of emigration conflicts with formal state institutions, political capital forms a 
pool of resources for circumventing local state policies and reducing the costs and stakes of 
unauthorized migration. However, when emigration is congruent with and openly promoted by 
local state institutions, the privileges and resources conferred by access to political capital tend to 
be much less important for successful migration.  
 Several additional observations are worth noting. First, the role of family migration 
networks is far from uniform. This factor is not necessarily always salient, nor is it always 
positive. The effect depends largely on macro-level factors that shape the legality of and barriers 
to emigration. Second, human capital selectivity of migration is closely associated with the 
contexts, and is not necessarily linearly associated with emigration. The process seems to reflect 
both the neoclassical model and new economics model of migration: education increases the 
likelihood of migration up to the secondary level, but then decreases the likelihood at the tertiary 
level. This is because individuals choose to diversify risks and maximize household welfare, as 
tertiary education becomes highly rewarded in the local economy. 
 Despite the substantial differences, the results highlight some fundamental processes that 
are highly consistent across settings and over time. One is the importance of village migration 
networks in sustaining emigration from both Fuzhou and Mingxi, as postulated by the 
cumulative causation thesis. Such networks provide ample information and strongly enduring 
incentives for migration, as well as create a culture of migration, thereby perpetuating respective 
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migration streams. This helps explain why Fuzhou migrants have continued to follow in the 
footsteps of their predecessors to the United States (rather than heavily exploring other 
destinations), in spite of the rising costs and difficulties of illegal migration. Second, the results 
show a persistent advantage of traditional positional power in China over time and across the two 
migration settings, as embodied in (individual) cadre status. This engages the market transition 
debate and suggests that marketization has not completely erased the privileges of positional 
power. Cadres have continued to enjoy ample local opportunities to benefit themselves, which 
makes emigration a much less appealing option for them. 
 It is important to acknowledge that emigrants from Fujian Province are only two of several 
important streams of emigration from China. The Fujianese case sheds light mostly on low- and 
semi-skilled labor immigration, as well as emigration from rural areas. It represents most of the 
irregular emigration from China to the United States (especially New York), and emigration to 
southern Europe. The migrant flows from Fujian are to a large degree similar to those from 
Zhejiang Province, another dominant source province of emigration to the United States and 
Europe. However, the Fujianese case is certainly not representative of all emigration from China, 
particularly the growing numbers of emigrants as students, skilled workers, and professionals, 
and those from the northeast provinces heading to non-US and non-European destinations. 
Nevertheless, we expect that some of what we learned from the Fujianese case would, at least to 
some degree, help explain other streams of Chinese emigration ingrained in varying macro-level 
contexts. For example, political capital is likely to be mobilized to facilitate the emigration of 
students and skilled workers. Also, even among student and skilled emigrants, the level of 
selectivity is likely to vary by destination contexts, with countries having more restrictive 
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immigration policies (e.g., the United States) drawing more selected immigrants than countries 
with more lenient immigration policies (e.g., southern Europe, until very recently). 
 The present investigation joins the growing scholarly emphasis on comparative 
immigration research that incorporates different sending and receiving contexts within a 
common framework. The different macro-level factors we delineate and the different selectivity 
of emigration we observe may very well shape the integration process of Chinese immigrants in 
the United States and Europe. This question sets a research agenda for the next stage of our 
comparative analysis—how Chinese immigrants fare under different and shifting contexts of exit 
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1. Labor market conditions in destination countries are not the focus of this study, because they 
are similar for Fujianese migrants. In both the United States and Europe, there exist ample 
employment opportunities for Chinese immigrants in the low- and semi-skilled labor market, and 
to some extent, in small business niches (Laczko 2003). 
 39 
Tables 
Table 1. Costs of Emigration from Fuzhou and Mingxi 
US dollar Fuzhou (%) Mingxi (%) 
< 10,000 24.3 91.1 
10,000 – 19,999  8.7 7.2 
20,000 – 29,999  11.3 0.9 
30,000 – 39,999  19.8 0.9 
40,000 – 49,999  11.7 0.0 
>49,999  24.3 0.0 
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Table 2. Characteristics (percentages) of Emigrants and Non-emigrants in Fuzhou and Mingxi, 
2003 
 Fuzhou Mingxi 
 Emigrants Non-emigrants Emigrants Non-emigrants 
Age     
  15-19 53.4* 46.6 22.7* 77.3 
  20-24 72.0 28.0 43.1 56.8 
  25-29 56.2 43.8 35.2 64.8 
  30-34 45.0 55.0 36.5 63.5 
  35-39 41.3 58.7 26.5 73.5 
  40-44 34.7 65.3 17.7 82.3 
  45-49 9.9 90.1 1.0 99.0 
  50-54 4.4 95.6 1.6 98.4 
  55-59 7.8 92.2 0.0 100.0 
  60+ 3.5 96.5 0.9 99.1 
Sex     
  Male 51.2* 48.8 31.0* 69.0 
  Female 28.7 71.3 16.4 83.6 
Marital Status     
  Ever married 31.4* 68.6 21.4* 78.6 
  Never married 61.7 38.3 31.8 68.2 
Education     
  No formal education 33.7* 66.3 5.4* 94.6 
  Elementary school 49.6 50.4 15.3 84.7 
  Junior high school 48.5 51.5 34.1 65.9 
  Senior high school 31.4 68.6 28.6 71.4 
  Vocational high school 26.9 73.1 15.7 84.3 
  College or above 13.5 86.5 12.5 87.5 
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Owning family business     
   Yes 34.5* 65.5 22.1 77.9 
   No 40.9 59.1 24.1 75.9 
Cadre     
   Yes 9.0* 91.0 4.6* 95.4 
   No 42.4 57.8 24.9 75.1 
Cadre in household     
   Yes 49.2* 50.8 20.6 79.3 
   No 39.7 60.3 24.8 75.2 
Ever emigrant in household     
   Yes 29.4* 70.6 16.0* 84.0 
   No 73.5 26.5 31.5 68.5 
Place of origin     
   Rural 40.2 59.8 23.7 76.3 
   Urban 42.5 57.5 22.0 77.9 
N 2,657 3,975 301 995 
* p <0.05 (chi-square tests). 
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Table 3. Coefficients of Discrete-Time Event History Analysis Predicting First Overseas Trip 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Fuzhou-US  Mingxi-Europe  
Prior emigrant in household   
  (ref. no prior emigrant)   
  Prior emigrant within 2 years -0.43** a 0.06 b 
 (0.08) (0.23) 
  Prior emigrant 2-5 years 0.03 0.35 
 (0.07) (0.22) 
  Prior emigrant over 5 years 0.19* -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.28) 
Village emigration prevalence ratio 4.17** 4.48** 
 (0.32) (0.64) 
Cadre -1.19** -1.68** 
 (0.17) (0.64) 
Cadre in household 0.29** 0.16 
 (0.06) (0.19) 
Education (ref. no formal education)   
  Elementary school 0.44** a 0.34 b 
 (0.13) (0.35) 
  Junior high school 0.67** 0.72+ 
 (0.13) (0.37) 
  Senior high school 0.74** 0.60 
 (0.14) (0.39) 
  Vocational high school 0.43* -0.26 
 (0.20) (0.47) 
  College or above -0.41+ -0.78 
 (0.23) (0.56) 
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Age (ref. 60+)   
  15-19 1.76** 2.64* 
 (0.71) (1.13) 
  20-24 2.69** 3.49** 
 (0.86) (1.11) 
  25-29 2.56** 3.43** 
 (0.64) (1.10) 
  30-34 2.29** 3.47** 
 (0.65) (1.10) 
  35-39 2.15** 3.23** 
 (0.41) (1.11) 
  40-44 1.64** 2.75* 
 (0.39) (1.12) 
  45-49 0.69* -0.49 
 (0.28) (1.46) 
  50-54 0.14 -0.08 
 (0.26) (0.28) 
  55-59 -0.79 -- 
 (0.85)  
Male 1.03** 0.99** 
 (0.05) (0.14) 
Ever married 0.15+ 0.16 
 (0.08) (0.21) 
Owning family business -0.34** -0.31 
 (0.08) (0.22) 
Rural area 0.14 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.23) 
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Note: Dummy variables of year are omitted. The coefficients generally show similar patterns as 
in figure 3. 
a Joint tests of education and of household migration networks are significant at 0.001 level. 
b Joint tests of education and of household migration networks are insignificant at 0.05 level. 
+ p <0.1; * p <0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Intercept -10.19** -9.08** 
 (0.67) (1.21) 
-2 log likelihood 21,008.8 2,228.4 
N person-years 145,655 11,566 
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Table 4. Coefficients from Heckman Selection Models of Factors Predicting Emigration Cost 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Fuzhou-US Mingxi-Europe 
Owning family business 0.18+ 0.04 
 (0.10) (0.05) 
Cadre -0.40 0.26 
 (0.27) (0.19) 
Cadre in household -0.28** 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.05) 
Prior emigrant in household   
  (ref. no prior emigrant)   
  Prior emigrant within 2 years -0.16+ -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.06) 
  Prior emigrant 2-5 years -0.43** -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
  Prior emigrant over 5 years -0.69** 0.12 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Village emigration prevalence ratio 2.74** 0.06 
 (0.31) (0.16) 
Rural area 0.01 0.06 
 (0.12) (0.06) 
-2 log likelihood 13,444.8 1,168.2 
Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0 (p-value) < 0.001 0.22 
N  6,632 1,296 
+ p <0.1; * p <0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Note: We took the midpoints of the emigration cost categories and converted them into the 2003 
constant U.S. dollars. They are log transformed and included in the regression. We used the 
Heckman selection model because emigration costs were observed only for emigrants. The first-
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stage regression (which predicts emigration status) is not shown. The predictors included in the 
first regression are the same as those included in table 3. 
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Table 5. Coefficients of Discrete-Time Event History Analysis Predicting First Overseas Trip in 
Fuzhou-US Migration by Period (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Stage 1  
(1978-1985)  
Stage 2  
(1986-1995) 
Stage 3  
(1996-2003) 




  Elementary school 0.32 0.29+  0.54**  
 (0.37) (0.15) (0.18) 
  Junior high school 0.77 0.56** 0.75** 
 (0.40) (0.16) (0.18) 
  Senior high school 0.45 0.60** 0.78** 
 (0.45) (0.18) (0.19) 
  Vocational high school 1.44 0.37 0.30 
 (0.91) (0.29) (0.25) 
  College or above -0.49 -0.42 -0.41 
 (1.16) (0.33) (0.27) 
Cadre -0.26 -1.05** -1.45** 
 (0.49) (0.26) (0.28) 
Cadre in household 0.35 0.31** 0.26** 
 (0.25) (0.09) (0.07) 
Prior emigrant in household    
  (ref. no prior emigrant)    
  Prior emigrant within 2 years 1.07*  -0.33**  -0.70**  
 (0.53) (0.10) (0.11) 
  Prior emigrant 2-5 years 2.61** 0.17 -0.25* 
 (0.38) (0.12) (0.10) 
  Prior emigrant over 5 years 3.15** 0.55** -0.20* 
 (0.24) (0.14) (0.09) 
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Village emigration prevalence 
ratio --
 a 6.42** 3.19** 
  (0.54) (0.36) 
Number of emigrants in each 
period 123 1,207 1,327 
Average cost of emigration ($) 13,413 29,376 50,839 
Percent likely through formal 
channels 66 29 34 
+ p <0.1; * p <0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Note: Other covariates, the same as those in table 3, were omitted from this table. We performed 
formal tests of differences across three periods. The role of human capital across three stages is 
quite similar (statistically insignificant). The role of cadre status and household cadre status in 
stages 2 and 3 is similar, but its role in stage 1 is significantly different from that at later stages 
(p < 0.05). For family emigration social capital, the difference is significant between stages 1 and 
2 (p < 0.05), and between stages 2 and 3 (p < 0.1). The role of village emigration prevalence 
ratio in stages 2 and 3 is significantly different at the 0.05 level.  
aWe exclude the village prevalence ratio in the first stage to provide more stable results, though 
including this variable does not change the substantive story. This is because the aggregated 
village-level emigration was very low and household migration was highly correlated with 
village migration at this stage. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Summary of Differences between Fuzhou Emigration to the U.S. and Mingxi 
Emigration to Europe 
 
Comparative features Fuzhou to the U.S. Mingxi to Europe 
 




*Greater distance from China 
*Elaborate and circuitous routes 
*Low permeability of the 
border 
 
*Proximity (overland) to China  
*Political transitions provide easy 
entryway 
*Lack of natural barriers and EU 




*Emphasis on family 
reunification 
*Asylum policies that draw 
illegal immigration 
*Diverse immigration regimes 
across Europe 
*Regular amnesty and legalization 
programs (i.e. Italy) 






*Opportunities for low- and 
semi-skilled workers in Chinese 
labor market 
*Occupational niche: service 
(i.e., restaurant) 
*Opportunities for low- and semi-
skilled workers in Chinese labor 
market 
*Occupational niche: manufacturing 
(i.e., garment) and import/export 
 
Socioeconomic 
environment of origin 
*Coastal area 




Political context of 
origin 
*Official condemnation of 
smuggling 
*Tightening control against 
illegal migration over time 
 
*Highly supportive of emigration 
*Proactive and open role 
 
Mode of emigration *Mostly clandestine channels 
*Very high barriers (high cost 
and risks) 
*Mostly legal entry 
*Low barriers (low costs and risks) 
*Evolving process (overstaying visa 
or migrating to other European 





Social capital *Stronger roles of social capital 
(*Village migration networks 
important) 
 
*Weaker roles of social capital 




Political capital *Strong role of political capital 
in circumventing formal 
institutions and enforcing illicit 
emigration 
(*Cadres have fewer incentives 
to emigrate) 
 
*Attenuated role of political capital 




*More strategizing and more 
selective on human capital 
 
*Less selective on human capital 
General pattern *Stabilizing  
*Barriers remain high; 
continued importance of social 














Fuzhou city 1,576.5 5,394 53.3 
Fuzhou Changle city 665.1 5,090 9.7 
Fuzhou Liangjiang county 616.3 4,048 7.9 
Mingxi county 115.6 3,413 0.99 
Source: Fujian Yearbook, 2003. 
Note: yuan is the currency in China. In 2003, 1 yuan is approximately 0.12 US dollar. 
Given variations within the Fuzhou region, we present statistics for the three sub-sampling areas 
separately. On average, the Fuzhou area had a much larger population than the Mingxi county. 
Despite noticeable variability within Fuzhou, it enjoyed a much higher level of economic 
development than Mingxi, as reflected in per capita income and GDP. The per capita income for 
the three Fuzhou migrant-sending counties/cities was 4,000–5,400 yuan, among the highest in 
Fujian Province. To put these numbers in perspective, in 2003, the average income in Fujian was 
3,538 yuan and for China as a whole was 2,475 yuan (National Bureau of Statistics 2003). In 





























































Figure 4. Emigration cost for Fuzhou and Mingxi emigrants by year.  
	  
